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The economy of knowledge
Scientific information can be considered an economic commodity.1 Authors produce papers as currency to acquire 
research employment, and, in turn, publishers sell these papers for profit. The appropriateness of monetising 
knowledge, and the sustainability of such business models, remains contentious.2-4 But I do not wish to embroider on 
science economics per se. Instead I highlight here how current publishing behaviour has been influenced by economic 
incentives – behaviour that can now be predicted by basic economic models.5 Understanding such behavioural 
changes in science culture will become helpful to identify potentially unethical publishing practices.6,7
The use of quantitative academic performance metrics
Eligibility criteria to secure employment or grants are generally based on quantitative academic performance indices, 
for example, number of papers, the h-index8,9, or citations per paper10. Science metrics have greatly advanced our 
understanding of publishing trends among authors, but are clearly also not without critique.11 I have previously 
commented on the pitfalls of unsophisticated performance measures in evaluating academic success among 
scholars from developed and developing nations.12 Current literature is filled with similar polemical opinions, where 
even choosing a journal to publish in has become an awkward affair.13 Yet for administrators these records remain 
helpful to initially separate the wheat from the chaff, and are easy and free to obtain online.14
Despite progress on reforming performance evaluations, such as the Leiden Manifesto15, it will take some time 
for the playing field to level out. The scene is therefore set for a new science culture of winners and losers. 
Aspiring academics will thus most likely have to actively manage their research productivity and performance5, 
more aggressively so than ever before in this hypercompetitive academic environment6,16.
The rise of unethical citation practices
A healthy economy is related to having greater productivity (e.g. exports) than consumption (e.g. imports). To maintain 
this healthy economy, it is crucial to predict future shortfalls in productivity that might lead to catastrophic losses in 
revenue. With millions of academic papers in circulation these days, predicting future citation yield, and thereby 
personal performance, might prove to be extremely difficult for scholars.5 Fears of disadvantage thus arise in especially 
aspiring academics, prompting collusive and coercive citation practices to reduce productivity uncertainty.5,6,17,18
Haley5 subsequently put forward three likely responses by academic authors facing metric performance uncertainty: 
(1) do nothing, thus relying on natural accumulation of citations from the wider science community; (2) switch 
research fields, perhaps to those more topical at the moment, aiding a rapid and steady citation accumulation; or 
(3) artificially inflate citations.
Examples of artificial inflation are in fact seen among authors, editors, reviewers and publishers. Authors may 
premeditate plans to cite underrepresented papers in their following works, regardless of true applicability to the 
current message at hand.17 Using coercive citation practices, reviewers may request authors to cite their papers, 
directly relevant or not, or editors may request authors to include more papers from their journal to improve journal 
impact factor.18 In turn, collusive citation practices, although less common, occur when two or more journals conspire 
to primarily cite papers found in each other’s issues, and in this way boost performance enormously19 – also termed 
‘citation stacking’, this is certainly one of the most concerning consequences of quantitative performance metrics. 
But perhaps the worst consequence of citation-based performance metrics, is the possibility to directly manipulate 
citation scores by creating fake publications riddled with self-citations.20
Too many tactics, too little science?
Using Haley’s5 three likely responses by authors to achieve metric success, I drew a three-bubble Venn diagram 
to conceptualise situations in which authors might use a combination of responses to mitigate citation uncertainty 
(Figure 1). I imagined four scenarios:
•	 The Desperate signifies authors who generally allow for the natural accumulation of citations of their papers, but 
sooner or later they realise that they are falling behind and start to actively manage ways to increase scores.
•	 The Schemer is primarily looking for ways to artificially inflate citations while simultaneously switching to 
more popular research topics whenever possible and/or joining larger groups of collaborators to share in their 
productivity. Doing nothing is beyond the realm of The Schemer as they know the current publishing game 
fortunes the connected, e.g. providing more opportunities to place papers while editing manuscripts.
•	 The Survivor is an author who generally allows for the natural accumulation of citations of their papers, like 
The Desperate. But instead of artificially trying to inflate scores when realising slow accumulation, this author 
increases citation probability by constantly switching to hot, citable topics or more innovative fields.
•	 The Abyss represents the point at which scholars utilise all three tactics. They can switch to popular or 
innovative fields, although often away from their expertise, thereby eventually creating a wide network of 
collaborations to share in the larger citation economy. These authors might also downplay ethically blurry 
citation practices, such as artificial inflation, as they also allow for natural accumulation and might resort 
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to playing the whole game. The Abyss is therefore the bottomless 
pit where mishmashes between intellectual and moral standards 
capture the minds of young academics.
Should the status quo in current scientific culture be maintained (where 
citations are seen as currency), then desperate and scheming authors 
would increasingly be found. Haley5 explained this to be the case as 
artificially inflated citations might require the least amount of effort or 
funds to increase visibility. The Survivor perhaps represents the least 
frowned-upon scenario to increase performance metrics. However, Haley5 
mentioned such strategies could lead to decreased publication quality, and 
citations are not necessarily guaranteed when shifting to more popular 
science avenues. Ultimately, even though some scholars will remain 
honest and open, the evolution of citation behaviour due to ill-advised 
incentives would eventually lead to great confusion among those that need 
it least – aspiring scientists. Too many tactics with too little science can 
potentially devastate the scientific endeavour as we know it.6,7
Figure 1:  Four hypothetical scenarios that might arise when aspiring 
academics use combinations of tactics to increase quantitative 
performance metrics (adapted from concepts in Haley5).
Collateral damage of unethical publishing to science culture
The collateral damage of self-interested publishing games is becoming 
more visible. Peer reviewers are growing increasingly scant.21 This fact is 
tough to believe given the staggering increase in published papers over the 
past few years – estimated at >2 million a year. Clearly, some reviewers 
are working more than others. In this era of paper gluttony and highly 
competitive scientific employment22, it is perhaps unsurprising that young, 
contract-based researchers might regard peer reviewing as belonging to 
more comfortable, permanent employees. This way they can write and 
cross-cite many papers. On the other hand, some might choose to review 
a lot to aid citation of their work. The spirit of peer reviewing is threatened.7
Lawrence16 summarised the dangers of an increasing ‘aggression factor’ 
on the psychology of people in a hypercompetitive science environment, 
where the battle for superiority may weaken the spirits of more gentle 
scholars to pursue academic careers. This way many brilliant minds, 
who became desperate or troubled, would leave. Who knows what 
wonderful discoveries have been and will be lost in the future.
Lighting-up academia’s darker side
Emerging economies need to be attractive to heighten interest from 
investors. So too needs to be the performance of aspiring academics. There 
are thus incentives to perform, and to perform well more often. No wonder 
economists can now describe how young researchers could behave to 
increase their chances of being spotted in the vast universe of academia. 
I wanted to highlight that behavioural changes in citation practices by 
authors facing performance uncertainty will become commonplace5 and 
will likely further evolve.6,7 It is crucial that more mature academics and 
administrators acknowledge the existence of these patterns so that those in 
charge can help manage younger academics to avoid becoming desperate 
and scheming, and finally getting lost in the moral abyss.
Torch-bearing policies are therefore urgently needed to light the way 
forward. Lane23 drew attention to the fact that if incentives are used to 
push productivity and performance in academia, then economists and 
social scientists must help reform the applications of purely number-based 
metrics. It is high time we re-visit extant and useful guidelines, such as the 
Leiden Manifesto, to better understand the limitations of available science 
metrics and how to apply them when evaluating personal excellence in 
complex academic environments.15,24
And while we are counting beans, the sixth mass extinction event has 
dawned.25 The idea of an inclusive, noble science environment should be 
alive and kicking to protect our vulnerable planet.6,26 To remain focused, we 
should consider eliminating quantitative performance measures altogether.
References
1. Stephan PE. How economics shapes science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press; 2012.
2. Young NS, Ioannidis JP, Al-Ubaydli O. Why current publication practices 
may distort science. PLoS Med. 2008;5(10), e201, 5 pages. https://doi.
org/10.1371/journal.pmed.0050201
3. Van Noorden R. Open access: The true cost of science publishing. Nature. 
2013;495(7442):426. https://doi:10.1038/495426a
4. Bergstrom TC, Courant PN, McAfee RP, Williams MA. Evaluating big deal 
journal bundles. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 2014;111(26):9425–9430. https://
doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1403006111
5. Haley MR. On the inauspicious incentives of the scholar-level h-index: 
An economist’s take on collusive and coercive citation. Appl Econ Lett. 
2017;24(2):85–89. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2016.1164812
6. Edwards MA, Roy S. Academic research in the 21st century: Maintaining 
scientific integrity in a climate of perverse incentives and hypercompetition. 
Environ Eng Sci. 2017;34(1):51–61. https://doi.org/10.1089/ees.2016.0223
7. Grant DB, Kovács G, Spens K. Questionable research practices in academia: 
Antecedents and consequences. Eur Bus Rev. 2018;30(2):101–127. https://
doi.org/10.1108/EBR-12-2016-0155
8. Hirsch JE. An index to quantify an individual’s scientific research output. 
Proc Natl Acad Sci. 2005;102(46):16569–16572. https://doi.org/10.1073/
pnas.0507655102
9. Hirsch JE. Does the h index have predictive power? Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 
2007;104(49):19193–19198. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0707962104
10. Lehmann S, Jackson AD, Lautrup BE. Measures for measures. Nature. 
2006;444(7122):1003. https://doi.org/10.1038/4441003a
11. Costas R, Bordons M. The h-index: Advantages, limitations and its 
relation with other bibliometric indicators at the micro level. J Informetr. 
2007;1(3):193–203. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joi.2007.02.001 
12. Crous CJ. Judge research impact on a local scale. Nature. 2014;513(7516):7. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/513007a
13. Lee AT, Simon CA. Publication incentives based on journal rankings 
disadvantage local publications. S Afr J Sci. 2018;114(9–10), Art. #a0289, 
3 pages. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/sajs.2018/a0289
14. Harzing AW, Van der Wal R. Google Scholar as a new source for citation 
analysis. Ethics Sci Environ Polit. 2008;8(1):61–73. https://doi.org/10.3354/
esep00076
15. Hicks D, Wouters P, Waltman L, Rijcke SD, Rafols I. Bibliometrics: The Leiden 
Manifesto for research metrics. Nature. 2015;520(7548):429. https://doi.
org/10.1038/520429a
16. Lawrence PA. The mismeasurement of science. Curr Biol. 2007;17(15):R583–
R585. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2007.06.014
17. Van Raan AF. Comparison of the Hirsch-index with standard bibliometric indicators 
and with peer judgment for 147 chemistry research groups. Scientometrics. 
2006;67(3):491–502. https://doi.org/10.1556/Scient.67.2006.3.10 
18. Wilhite AW, Fong EA. Coercive citation in academic publishing. Science. 
2012;335(6068):542–543. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1212540
 The darker side of academic performance metrics
 Page 2 of 3
3 Volume 115| Number 7/8 July/August 2019
Commentary
https://doi.org/10.17159/sajs.2019/5785
19. Van Noorden R. Brazilian citation scheme outed. Nature. 2013;500(7464):510–
511. https://doi.org/10.1038/500510a
20. Delgado López‐Cózar E, Robinson‐García N, Torres‐Salinas D. The Google 
Scholar experiment: How to index false papers and manipulate bibliometric 
indicators. J Assoc Inf Sci Technol. 2014;65(3):446–454. https://doi.
org/10.1002/asi.23056
21. Lajtha K, Baveye PC. How should we deal with the growing peer-review problem? 
Biogeochemistry. 2010;101:1–3. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10533-010-9530-6
22. Siegel D, Baveye P. Battling the paper glut. Science. 2010;329(5998):1466. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.329.5998.1466-a
23. Lane J. Let’s make science metrics more scientific. Nature. 2010;464(7288):488. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/464488a
24. Braun T, Bergstrom CT, Frey BS, Osterloh M, West JD, Pendlebury D, et al. 
How to improve the use of metrics. Nature. 2010;465(17):870–872. https://
doi.org/10.1038/465870a
25. Ceballos G, Ehrlich PR, Dirzo R. Biological annihilation via the ongoing sixth 
mass extinction signaled by vertebrate population losses and declines. Proc 
Natl Acad Sci USA. 2017;114(30):E6089–E6096. https://doi.org/10.1073/
pnas.1704949114
26. Lawrence PA. The politics of publication. Nature. 2003;422(6929):259. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/422259a.
 The darker side of academic performance metrics
 Page 3 of 3
